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This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax 
benefit link affects retirement and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that 
postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax 
benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We 
show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers, 
or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We also provide a sharp 
characterization of the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the 
behavioral supply elasticities of the extensive and intensive margins and the effective tax rates 
implicit in contribution rates. 
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In light of the concerns faced by policy makers regarding the long-run funding of public
pensions, many countries have initiated reforms. Apart from the need to restore sus-
tainability to pension systems, these reforms are importantly motivated by the concerns
regarding the potentially adverse consequences of existing programs for labor market in-
centives. For these reasons, most countries have initiated reforms that i) strengthen the
tax-beneﬁt link by, for instance, bringing more people into a harmonized pension sys-
tem in which pensions are assessed on the basis of past earnings; and ii) introduce more
actuarial fairness in order to provide disincentives, or “penalties”, for early retirement
and to improve the incentives for labor market participation of older workers nearing
retirement. It has been long recognized that the tax character of pension contributions
tends to discourage work eﬀort of the actively employed (intensive labor supply). This
has led policy makers to propose a tighter tax-beneﬁt link to reduce distortions in the
labor supply decision faced by younger workers. More recently, the date, or timing, of the
retirement decision has received increasing attention. To raise the average retirement age,
recent reforms often include adjustments of the pension size to provide stronger incentives
for continued work (extensive labor supply).1
What is less well-known are the important interactions between the incentives facing
younger and older workers. Rewarding late retirement might have quite adverse conse-
quences for implicit taxes faced by younger workers. While some approaches to pension
reform might succeed in strengthening labor supply on both margins, by encouraging
work eﬀort of younger workers and simultaneously participation of older workers, other
scenarios might favor one margin at the expense of the other, with possibly no clear cut
net eﬀect on aggregate labor supply. The goal of this paper is, then, to develop a formal
model that helps to clarify how the incentives of young and old workers interact and how
pension reforms might give rise to either oﬀ-setting or mutually reinforcing eﬀects on
1Policies to encourage earlier retirement are not unknown, however. See Bratberg et al. (2004) for an
analysis of an early retirement program that was instituted in Norway in 1989.
1aggregate labor supply.
There is a large literature on pension economics and old age insurance; see, for exam-
ple, Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Bovenberg (2003), Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and
Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a few important reviews. The recent policy debate in the
U.S. has focussed to a great extent on the choice between increased capital funding [e.g.
Kotlikoﬀ (1997), Feldstein (2005a,b), and Feldstein and Samwick (2002)] versus paramet-
ric reform of existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems [e.g. Diamond (2004), Diamond and
Orszag (2005)]. Apart from its impact on national savings, the potential labor market
implications of public pensions have always played an important role in this debate. An
on-going concern is the eﬀect on intensive labor supply, i.e. hours worked by the active
generation. In this regard, the crucial question is the extent to which the contributions
to social security are actually perceived as a tax by the active generation. The answer
depends, of course, on the institutional design of the PAYG system. In a system with a
tax-beneﬁt link in which pensions are based on past earnings, the eﬀective tax rate can
amount to roughly half of the statutory contribution rate, as recent calculations for Ger-
many by Fenge and Werding (2004) have shown. Beginning with Feldstein and Samwick
(1972), the existing literature has calculated a much higher tax component for young
workers far from retirement, while the eﬀective tax is, in contrast, much lower for workers
nearing retirement. Disney (2004) provided recent computations of the eﬀective tax rates
implied by PAYG contributions and econometric estimates of the employment eﬀects.
The results are consistent with usual ﬁndings of the empirical literature on intensive la-
bor supply, namely that male employment is not particularly responsive to tax incentives,
while female activity rates are highly adversely aﬀected by the eﬀective contribution tax.
According to the inﬂuential studies of Gruber and Wise (1999a, 1999b, 2002), a seri-
ous problem associated with PAYG systems is that they impose signiﬁcant disincentives
to work at older ages. Gruber and Wise (2005) provide calculations for the relationship
between later retirement and the amount of additional beneﬁts that lead to actuarial
fairness. Börsch-Supan (2000, 2003) provides evidence on participation decision of older
2workers for Germany. Scarpetta (1996) ﬁnds empirical evidence supporting this phenom-
enon in a cross-country study. A major factor behind the “trend” toward early retirement
in developed economies is that existing PAYG systems distort the labor supply decision
on the extensive margin and thereby encourage early retirement. Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) suggest that early retirement provisions in many countries have led to a dramatic
decrease in the labor force participation among older workers. The fact that beneﬁts are
not adjusted in an actuarially fair manner is a key reason for this large distortion on the
extensive margin. Theoretical work on social security and retirement decisions is inspired
by the seminal contributions of Feldstein (1974) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). More
recent theoretical contributions on the (optimal) design of pension systems in the presence
of a retirement decision is found, for example, in Breyer and Kifmann (2002), Cremer and
Pestieau (2003) and Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004).2
The novel contribution of this paper is to shed more light on how the structure of
existing PAYG pension systems simultaneously aﬀect the intensive and extensive margins
of labor supply. In particular, the paper will show how the eﬀective tax rates on intensive
labor supply of younger workers and the participation tax rate of older workers, and
therefore the extensive and intensive labor supply responses, importantly interact with
each other, depending on the speciﬁc institutional design of the system. We are able to
provide a sharper characterization of the excess burden of a PAYG pension system that
brings out the parallels with the recent literature, found in Kleven and Kreiner (2006),
Immervoll et al. (2007) and Saez (2002), on labor taxation in the presence of intensive and
extensive supply. We show how the excess burden depends i) on the behavioral elasticities
with respect to prime-age labor supply and the retirement decision of older workers and
ii) on the eﬀective tax rates for these two groups. We then turn to parametric pension
2See Fenge and Pestieau (2005) for a review. Breyer and Hupfeld (2007) point out the distributional
consequences of pension adjustments that incorporate more actuarial fairness. Bommier et. al (2005)
emphasize redistribution towards the short-lived, while Cremer et. al. (2004) focus on redistribution
towards the ill. The redistributional implications of retirement incentives are, nevertheless, not the focus
of this paper.
3reform and derive the behavioral response and welfare implications of strengthening the
tax-beneﬁt link and introducing more actuarial fairness by making the pension eligibility
rules more sensitive to the choice of the retirement date. These are important reform
strategies chosen by numerous countries in the recent past. To our knowledge, a rigorous
analysis of a marginal reform of the tax-beneﬁt link by making it more sensitive with
respect to retirement age is also novel.
To focus on the essential mechanisms, the model we consider is a simple one. Agents
are risk neutral, live two periods, make an intensive labor supply decision when young
and an extensive, participation choice in the second period of life. Production technology
is Ricardian and labor markets are competitive. Consumer-workers make their choices
subject to a general pension earnings rule that conveniently parameterizes diﬀerent degrees
of actuarial fairness and encompasses the most important speciﬁcations of actual pension
systems: i) a Beveridge-type system in which “ﬂat” old-age earnings are independent of
contributions; ii) a Bismarckian PAYG system that incorporates a constant tax-beneﬁt
link, although one that is not sensitive to the chosen retirement age and is, thus, actuarially
unfair; iii) a modiﬁed PAYG system that actuarially adjusts – in the sense of Gruber-
Wise – the pension rule according to the participation decision; and iv) a fully-funded
system in which contributions yield the market rate of interest and pension earnings are
adjusted to take into account the chosen length of the retirement period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the households and
their intensive and extensive labor supply decisions subject to the structure of the PAYG
system. This part of the paper also outlines the equilibrium OLG framework and calcu-
lates the responses of intensive and extensive work eﬀo r tt oas o c i o e c o n o m i ct r e n dt o w a r d
early retirement, including its impact on the pension system. In section 3, we introduce
the welfare measure, compute the consequences of a higher statutory contribution rate,
and characterize the marginal excess burden resulting from the expansion of the system.
Section 4 is devoted to parametric pension reform, including several scenarios of strength-
ening the tax-beneﬁt link and introducing a greater degree of actuarial fairness. The
4p a p e rc l o s e si ns e c t i o n5w i t hab r i e fs u m m a r y .
2 The Model
2.1 Households
In order to concentrate on labor market behavior of young and old workers, we keep
the macroeconomic framework as simple as possible. Regarding representative consumer-
workers, we assume they live two periods and are risk neutral. Leaving aside issues related
to savings, we make the simplifying assumption that present and future consumption, ct,
t =1 ,2, are prefect substitutes. In other words, agents care only about the present
value and not the timing of consumption. In assuming a Ricardian framework, labor
productivity is the same in both periods and is ﬁxed at unity.3 With competitive labor
markets, the (real) wage is also unity, MPL= W =1 ,a n dt h e r ei sn ou n e m p l o y m e n t .
We specify further that agents face the choice of how hard to work when young and
when to retire when old. The former is an intensive labor supply decision, L, while the
extensive labor supply margin reﬂects a discrete participation decision of whether to work
a ta l l . T h er e t i r e m e n td a t ei sd e n o t e db yx and corresponds to the share of the overall
old age period spent in active employment. First and second period budgets (normalized
by the ﬁxed wage rate of unity) correspond to
c1 =( 1− τ)L − s, c2 = x · (1 − τ)+( 1− x) · p + Rs, (1)
where s is savings, τ is the statutory contribution rate to the pension system, p represents
pension earnings, and R(≡ 1+r) is the (constant) interest factor. During the second
period of life, the agent continues working for a share x of the entire period and retires
for the remaining part 1 − x. We refer to the variable x as the retirement date. Upon
3Our framework abstracts from a human capital accumulation decision. See Lau and Poutvaara (2006)
for an analysis of the interactions between social security and human capital.
5retirement, wage earnings are replaced by pension income. To further simplify, we assume
that labor supply in the second period is ﬁxed.
Life-time utility of an agent is of the usual intertemporally separable form. For simplic-
ity, we exclude income eﬀects on labor supply and additionally assume that consumption
and work eﬀort are separable within each period,
V = c1 − ϕ(L)+
1
R
· [c2 − βφ(x)], (2)
where the parameter β scales the preference for early versus late retirement. Disutility
of work eﬀort ϕ(L) when young and of continued employment φ(x) during old age are
convex increasing, i.e. the derivatives ϕ0, ϕ00, φ
0, φ
00 are all positive. Given that present
and future consumption are perfect substitutes, the interest rate must be equal to the
rate of time preference and is, thus, exogenous.
Since it is crucial in analyzing alternative pension policies, we must describe in detail
the factors inﬂuencing pension earnings, p.T h e ya r eg i v e nb y
p = m(x)[τL· R
p + τx]+b, (3)
where b is a “ﬂat” pension payment independent of contributions. The pension system
might pay interest on contributions, which is reﬂected by the factor Rp.T h e k e y r e l a -
tionship in our analysis is the conversion factor m(x) that scales contributions from past
earnings into a pension entitlement. It reﬂects the tax-beneﬁt link that can be actuarially
adjusted depending on old-age labor market participation, or retirement, decision x.T h e
speciﬁcation (3) encompasses several distinct pension regimes: i) a Beveridge-type system
(m(x)=0 )i nw h i c h“ ﬂat” old-age earnings are independent of contributions, p = b;i i )a
Bismarckian PAYG system that incorporates a constant tax-beneﬁtl i n k ,m(x)=m0 > 0,
with b =0and Rp =1 . If the conversion factor does not increase in the retirement date,
the system remains unfair in the sense that pension adjustment does not reﬂect the length
of the remaining life-time, equal to 1−x; iii) a modiﬁed PAYG system with an actuarial
adjustment of pensions conditional on the retirement date (“Gruber-Wise” incentives),
m0(x) > 0; and iv) a fully-funded system in which contributions earn the market rate of
6interest, Rp = R, and pension earnings are adjusted to take into account the length of
the retirement period so that m(x)=1 /(1 − x).4
To model the implications of a number of structural pension reforms, we assume that




+ m0,α > 0, (4)
which embeds an actuarial adjustment component (α/1 − x)a n dac o n s t a n tt e r mm0
scaling the tax-beneﬁt link. Actuarial adjustment is partial if 0 <α<1 and complete if
α =1 . Given (3)—(4), the Bismarck-type pension equals p = m0τ [L + x], while its fully
capital funded counterpart is p =( 1− x)
−1 τ [L · R + x],w i t hb = m0 =0 . Substituting
the pension formula of the funded system into the budget identities of the agent shows that
life-time wealth is independent of the parameters of the pension system, i.e. c1 +c2/R =
L+x/R. The fully funded system provides a perfect substitute for private savings in this
framework.
Substituting the budget identities into the value function V yields the problem
V =m a x
L,x
(1 − τ)L − ϕ(L)+
1
R
[x(1 − τ)+( 1− x)p − βφ(x)], (5)
subject to p determined by (3)—(4). The optimality condition with respect to a young
worker’s labor supply decision is
ϕ
0 (L)=( 1− τL),τ L = τ · [1 − (1 − x)m · R
p/R] <τ, (6)
where τL is the implicit tax rate on ﬁrst-period employment L in the sense of Feldstein and
Samwick (1992). It will be discussed more fully below. The participation, or retirement,
decision of an older worker is governed by
βφ




4As Feldstein (2005a) points out, the absence of a tax-beneﬁt link implies that an agent’s contributions
represent a 100% tax rate. Regarding PAYG systems with a tax-beneﬁt link, Fenge and Werding (2003)
provide evidence that approximately 50% of contributions in Germany are eﬀectively taxed.
7where the derivative in the last term,
∂p
∂x
= τ · [m
0 · (LR
p + x)+m], (8)
reﬂects the eﬀect on pension earnings of choosing a longer working life x. Since (6)—(8),
together with the economy’s resource constraints, determine the equilibrium response of
workers to pension policy, it is important to analyze these conditions in more detail.
2.2 Intensive Labor Supply
Observe in (6) that the implicit tax τL on intensive labor supply is less than the statutory
rate τ. In a system with a tax-beneﬁt link, pensions are assessed on the basis of past
wage earnings. Greater work eﬀort by the young therefore raises not only their current
income, but also leads to higher retirement income when old. This means that not all
of the contribution rate is perceived as a “pure” tax, since agents foresee an individual
return in terms of a higher pension entitlement accruing in the retirement period 1 − x.
Moreover, the simple relationship in (6) contains the essential insights regarding intensive
labor supply.
First, when contributions earn no interest (Rp =1 ) under a PAYG system, future
beneﬁts are discounted by the market interest rate. The younger an agent, the more
distant are future pensions, and, hence, the larger is the discounting. For this reason,
empirical calculations, such as in Feldstein and Samwick (1992) or Fenge and Werding
(2003), show that implicit tax rates tend to be rather high for younger workers and fall
as the retirement date approaches. Second, if the retirement age x increases, pensions
are consumed for a smaller remaining retirement period. If the conversion factor is not
increased simultaneously, a higher retirement age raises implicit tax rates on the young and
lead to a larger distortion of intensive labor supply. Third, the formula nests the extreme
cases of ﬂat PAYG (Beveridge) and fully funded systems. In a ﬂat system without any
tax-beneﬁt link, m =0 , pension contributions are eﬀectively taxed at the statutory rate,
τL = τ. In contrast, τL is zero under the fully funded system. The fully funded system
8pays full interest on contributions, Rp = R, and also adjusts pension size in an actuarially
fair way, m =( 1− x)
−1, to take account of the length of the remaining retirement period.
Note that a Gruber-Wise adjustment for late retirement adjusts the conversion factor
in a similar way and, hence, reduces the implicit tax on young workers. However, since
contributions earn no interest, this adjustment is not suﬃcient to entirely eliminate the
implicit tax on the young.
Calculating the intensive labor supply response in (6) in terms of proportional rates
of change yields
ˆ L = −σ · ˆ τL,σ ≡ ϕ
0/(Lϕ
00) > 0, (9)
where ˆ τL ≡ dτL/(1 − τL) and σ is the (constant) net wage elasticity of work eﬀort.5
Clearly, a rise in the implicit tax rate τL reduces ﬁrst-period labor supply. As argued
above, the implicit tax rate depends, through the tax-beneﬁtl i n k ,o nt h er e t i r e m e n td a t e
x.W e n o w s e t RP =1 , an assumption we employ in the rest of the paper, and use




· ˆ x. (10)
Consequently, intensive labor supply of young workers is linked to the retirement behav-















reﬂecting the fact that longer working life raises the eﬀective tax rate on young workers.
2.3 Retirement Decision
As indicated, we assume that continued employment of older workers leads to progressively
increasing disutility of labor market participation, φ
00 > 0. The retirement decision in
(7) balances the marginal cost of labor market participation βφ
0 (x) against the income
5For a variable y, ˆ y represents the relative change ˆ y ≡ dy/y. The change in the tax rate is relative to
the tax factor, ˆ τ ≡ dτ/(1 − τ).
9diﬀerential between wages and pension earnings that becomes available by postponing
retirement by another instant. The impact of the pension system on retirement behavior
can be summarized by a single eﬀective tax measure that is obtained upon rewriting (7)
as
βφ




where τR is a participation tax rate, often called the implicit retirement tax.
It summarizes all ﬁscal incentives and disincentives for retirement in a single metric,
which consists of: i) the wage taxes paid on a worker’s salary, ii) the pension foregone
with continued employment, and iii) the pension increase over the remaining retirement
period if the system incorporates actuarial adjustment. The “implicit retirement tax”
discussed in pension economics literature is completely parallel to the participation tax
analyzed in the literature on extensive labor supply by researchers such as Saez (2002),
Immervoll et al. (2007), and Kleven and Kreiner (2006). Note, in particular, how an
actuarial adjustment of pensions in the sense of Gruber and Wise, (∂p/∂x > 0), lowers
the eﬀective retirement tax. This adjustment compensates for prolonged contribution
payments due to continued work and a shorter retirement period and, hence, a shorter
period of pension take-up. In a Beveridge type system without a tax-beneﬁtl i n k( m =0 )
and, thus, with a ﬂat pension, the retirement tax would equal τR = τ +p,i . e .t h es u mo f
the contribution rate τ plus the (normalized) replacement rate p. Finally, the retirement
tax is zero (τR =0 ) in the fully funded system. In this case the pension is increased in an
actuarially fair way when retirement is postponed in order to compensate for the extra
contributions and foregone pensions over the longer contribution period and the shorter
duration of beneﬁts.
To measure how retirement behavior responds to ﬁscal incentives, we calculate the
log-derivative of (12),
ˆ x = −η ·
³






00 > 0, (13)
where the parameter η is the elasticity of labor market participation. Participation
declines and retirement occurs earlier if the eﬀective tax rate τR increases. A larger
10disutility β from continued work reﬂects exogenous socioeconomic factors leading to a
trend to earlier retirement, a case that will be explored in greater detail below.
Since the participation tax rate τR is a function of x, it is important to explore its
properties further. First, it is convenient to express pension earnings in (3) in terms of
the pension assessment base, which we denote by z:
p = m(x)τz(x)+b, z(x)=L(x)+x. (14)
With an earnings-linked pension formula such as (14), pension entitlements become
sensitive to the retirement date via three channels: i) postponing retirement augments
the pension assessment base by prolonging the active working period in old age, which
translates into a higher pension depending on the conversion factor m; ii) postponing
retirement increases, however, (see (10)), the implicit tax rate on young workers, thereby
discouraging intensive labor supply L and shrinking the assessment base, which leads
to smaller pensions; and iii) the system can directly encourage postponed retirement by
raising the conversion factor m. For convenience, we employ primes to denote the partial
derivatives of m, z and p with respect to x.T h eﬁrst two eﬀects are summarized by z0 > 0,
which is positive if the intensive labor supply elasticity is not too large.6 The last eﬀect
depends on m0 ≥ 0 and is clearly zero if the system provides no actuarial adjustment
with respect to the choice of x. The sensitivity of pension size with respect to the chosen
retirement date is thus
p
0 = τ · [zm
0 + mz
0] > 0,p





We next analyze the eﬀect of an extended working life on the participation tax. Diﬀer-
entiating τR g i v e ni n( 1 2 )w i t hr e s p e c tt ox, substituting (15), and using (1 − x)m00 =2 m0





R = τ · [2m0z
0 − (1 − x)mz
00] ≥ 0, (16)
6To guarantee z0 =1+L0 > 0,w ea s s u m eΨ < 1 (see equation (11) above), which holds for suﬃciently
small values of m0 and σ.
11where z00 = L00 < 0.7 Postponed retirement raises (resp. leaves unaﬀected) the partic-
ipation tax. If there is no tax-beneﬁt link, the participation tax rate is independent of
t h er e t i r e m e n td a t e . I ft h ec o n v e r s i o nf a c t o rr e m a i n sﬁxed and excludes any actuarial
adjustment (m0 > 0 and α =0 ), then z0 > 0 >z 00, implying a higher participation tax
due to postponed retirement, τ0
R > 0. If, instead, the conversion factor is actuarially ad-
justed to the retirement date (m = α/(1 − x) and m0 =0 ), the participation tax is also
independent of the retirement date. In this case, with (1 − x)m = α, retirement behavior
does not inﬂuence the implicit tax on the young, so that ﬁrst period labor supply remains
unaﬀected and the assessment base satisﬁes z0 =1and z00 =0 .
2.4 Equilibrium
Our model is very stylized with only three overlapping generations and two periods. The
focus is on generation 1 that is young in period 1 and old in period 2.T o c l o s e t h e
model, we assume the existence of an initial old generation of pensioners (generation 0)
coexisting in period 1 with the young generation 1. We further assume a future generation
of workers in period 2 which lives for one period and coexists with generation 1 when it is
old.8 The upper index identiﬁes generations 0 ‘old’ and f ‘future’, while variables without
an upper index refer to the active generation 1, which is the only generation living over
the entire two period life-cycle. The only activity of the old generation 0 is to consume






7Observe that z00 is negative. Given the assumption σ<1, (10)—(11) imply z00 = L00 = −1−σ
σ·L ·Ψ2 < 0.
8Clearly, our model does not incorporate demographic eﬀects such as ageing. Recent work that
considers the implications of ageing on pension systems includes Ono (2003) and Lacomba and Lagos
(2006). Ono (2003) shows that debt funded social security systems can lead to dynamic ineﬃciencies
and multiple equilibria, while Lacomba and Lagos (2006) focus on the eﬀects of ageing on the optimal
statutory retirement age. They ﬁnd the eﬀects depend on whether the pension system is a deﬁned
contribution or deﬁned beneﬁt scheme.
12Since our focus is on the behavior of generation 1,w ea s s u m ea w a yl a b o rm a r k e tp a r -
ticipation on the part of generation 0. In other words, it is fully retired. The counterpart
of generation 0 is a ‘future’ generation, which lives for only one period and inelastically
supplies one eﬃciency unit of labor. In period 2, both the young and the old of generation
1 receive a competitive wage W =1 . Members of the future generation are assumed to
be fully employed. Their sole activity is to consume ﬁxed labor earnings, after paying
contributions to ﬁnance pensions of the then old generation 1.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that
any PAYG pension system basically redistributes from future to present generations:
V
f = c
f =( 1− τ). (18)
The budgets of the PAYG system in periods 1 and 2 are
p
0 = τL, (1 − x)p = τ · (1 + x), (19)
w h e r ew ea g a i nn o r m a l i z ei nt e r m so fﬁxed wage rate of unity. In the second period, τ
represents the contributions from the future generation and τxf r o mt h ea c t i v ep a r to ft h e
old of generation 1. Consequently, the pension is partly funded by an intergenerational
transfer.9
Given a Ricardian technology, output in period 1 is simply L. Substituting (19) into
the budget identity (1) and using (17) yields the GDP identity L = c1 + c0 + s for the
ﬁrst period. Output is spent on consumption by young and old agents and on private
investment s.10 In the second period, new output 1+x is produced by generation 2 and by
the still active part of generation 1. To obtain output market clearing, we aggregate (1)
and (18) and substitute for (19) to yield: c2+cf =1+x+Rs. Second period GDP equals
new output plus the yield on ﬁrst period investment. Since the world ends thereafter,
output is fully consumed.
9In the funded system, the budget would apply to each person separately, making the generational
account zero and eliminating intergenerational redistribution: (1 − x)p = τ · (LR + x).
10The investment technology is linear with coeﬃcient R and present and future consumption are perfect
substitutes. Since it is not required for the present purposes, we intentionally leave savings and investment
undetermined in our model. Alternatively, we can impose a small open economy assumption.
132.5 Early Retirement
The equilibrium of the economy is fully characterized by a retirement age x and a “ﬂat”,
lump-sum pension b that simultaneously satisfy the extensive labor market condition
(12) and the budget constraint (19).11 The linearized versions of these two conditions,
which take into account the intensive labor supply choice in (11), are derived in the
appendix–see (A.2) and (A.4)–and are illustrated in the (x,b) plane by Figure 1.
The participation condition describes a downward-sloping relationship, since a higher ﬂat
pension makes early retirement more attractive, which reduces the retirement age. In
contrast, the budget condition is upward-sloping, since the PAYG system can support
ag r e a t e rl e v e lo fﬂat pensions over the remaining retirement period if the working life
of agents is extended. The intersection of the two (linear) relationships determines the










Fig. 1: Early Retirement
Before proceeding with an analysis of parametric pension reform, we ﬁrst illustrate
how an exogenous trend toward early retirement alters labor market choices on both
margins and aﬀects the pension system. An early retirement “trend” results from exoge-
11Our subsequent analysis refers, then, to a deﬁned contribution system in which the contribution rate
is ﬁxed and pension size must ultimately be adjusted to guarantee the system’s solvency.
14nous socioeconomic factors and is modeled by an increase in the preference parameter β
that determines the disutility of old-age labor market participation. Holding the pension
parameters ﬁxed, equations (A.2) and (A.4) then simplify to









· ˆ β, db =
τRx
1 − x
· ˆ x, (20)
which we solve for the equilibrium responses:



























Not surprisingly, a preference shift toward early retirement reduces participation in the
old-age labor market, ˆ x<0. Furthermore, it requires budget consolidation to keep
the system sustainable, and, consequently, leads to pension cuts, db < 0,a sF i g u r e1
illustrates.12 Interestingly, early retirement also reduces the implicit retirement tax rate
in equilibrium




The result is, again, quite intuitive. Not only does the participation tax decline when the
ﬂat component b of pensions fall, it also declines with an earlier retirement date x.
The eﬀect on the participation tax occurs via the term ε ≡ τ0
Rx/(1 − τR) and is present
only if the earnings-linked part of pension income is relatively insensitive to variations in
retirement behavior. In this case the conversion factor depends largely on the ﬁxed term
m0 and does not compensate suﬃciently in terms of pension supplements p0 received for
the prolonged contribution and shorter retirement periods. This, in turn, magniﬁes the
imbalance between the marginal returns and costs of postponing retirement, implying that
12Observe, however, that an explicit consolidation is necessary only when the system is actuarially
unfair in the sense of Gruber and Wise and features a positive τR. An actuarially fair system with
τR =0consolidates automatically, since earlier retirement reduces the conversion factor, reﬂecting the
resulting longer retirement and shorter contribution periods.
15the participation tax rate increases with the retirement date, τ0
R > 0. Correspondingly,
the participation tax rate declines when agents retire earlier. This reduction, of course,
tends to encourage later retirement, but cannot oﬀset the “trend” to early retirement
from the original preference shock.
Irrespective of whether the system includes an actuarially fair adjustment for changes
in the length of the retirement period, we ﬁnd, interestingly, that early retirement raises




· ˆ x<0 ⇒ ˆ L = −σ · ˆ τL > 0. (23)
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s u l ti sb e s tu n d e r s t o o db yr e f e r e n c et ot h eB i s m a r c k i a ns y s t e m
with a ﬁx e dc o n v e r s i o nf a c t o r ,m = m0. In this case contribution payments yields pension
gains earlier in life and over a longer retirement period when the retirement date is moved
forward. Therefore, the implicit tax rate deﬁned in (6) must fall, stimulating intensive
labor supply. Moreover, even if the conversion factor m includes an actuarial component,
the implicit tax rate on the young falls, as long as the reduction in the conversion factor
is insuﬃciently great.13
3E ﬃciency of Public Pensions
3.1 Welfare Measure
To judge the eﬃciency of alternative pension systems, we need a consistent welfare metric.
To this end, we use the PAYG budgets in (19) to restate indirect utility of all three
13The implicit tax rate on intensive labor supply is independent of retirement behavior only if the
conversion factor depends exclusively on retirement duration, i.e. m0 =0and m = α/(1 − x) imply a





V =( 1 − τ)L − ϕ(L)+[ x(1 − τ)+( 1− x)p − βφ(x)]/R, (24)
V
f =( 1 − τ)=( 1− τ)+τ · (1 + x) − (1 − x)p.
The utilitarian social welfare function, also employed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), is
the discounted sum of individual utilities
Φ = RV
0 + V + V
f/R = L − ϕ(L)+
1
R
[1 + x − βφ(x)], (25)
where the second equality follows upon substituting (19). This welfare function exclusively
reﬂects economic eﬃciency and does not incorporate distributional concerns.14
Given that intensive and extensive labor supply are the only behavioral margins, the
welfare eﬀects of pension policy must be proportional to changes in x and L.T a k i n gt h e
diﬀerential of (25), substituting for the private choices of work eﬀort and retirement in
(6) and (12), and letting W =1 ,w eﬁnd









Note that the coeﬃcients on dL and dx for the change in welfare dΦ reﬂect the diﬀerences
between the social and private returns of a marginal increase in hours worked, 1 vs. 1−τL,
and in the retirement date, 1 vs. 1−τR. Substituting for ˆ L and ˆ x from (9) and (13) (and
holding ˆ β =0 ), the welfare eﬀects become
dΦ = τLL · ˆ L +
τRx
R
· ˆ x = −τL · σL· ˆ τL − τR · η
x
R
· ˆ τR. (27)
The welfare impact of any behavioral changes induced by pension reform is, to the ﬁrst
order, proportional to the eﬀective tax rates on work eﬀort and old age participation.
The pension system is the only source of ineﬃciency in our simple framework. If it were
absent, allocation would be Pareto optimal. Introducing small contributions and pension
entitlements would, to the ﬁrst order, entail a zero marginal welfare impact.
14This is less restrictive than it seems. As in Keuschnigg (1994), we can analytically separate eﬃciency
from intergenerational redistribution. In Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000), this decomposition is used to
construct an (ex ante) Pareto-improving reform.
173.2 Higher Statutory Tax Rate
To study the labor market and eﬃciency eﬀects of PAYG pensions, we ﬁrst consider an
increase in the statutory contribution rate τ. Since the analysis of the general case is quite
complex, we concentrate on three speciﬁc scenarios to bring out the main message of our
analysis. First, we consider complete actuarial fairness in the sense that the unfunded
system adjusts the earnings-linked pension to take into account the length of the retire-
ment period. This case emphasizes that while actuarial adjustment in the sense of Gruber
and Wise eliminates the distortion in the retirement date, it is insuﬃcient to ensure that
the labor market is neutral with respect to the pension system. The second scenario
assumes a ﬁxed labor supply of younger workers and incomplete actuarial adjustment in
the pension formula. Here, we show that a Bismarckian system with a ﬁxed tax-beneﬁt
link mitigates, but does not remove, the distortion in the retirement decision. The third
scenario entirely eliminates any tax-beneﬁt link and considers the labor market impact
of ﬂat pensions unrelated to past earnings. The succeeding section will then characterize
the excess burden of this case in which labor market is distorted both on the intensive
and extensive margins.
Actuarial Fairness: A number of countries have reformed their earnings-linked PAYG
systems by including pension supplements in the sense of Gruber and Wise to compensate
for postponed retirement. If the pension rule is made suﬃciently sensitive to the choice of
retirement date and adjusts the conversion factor in an actuarially fair way to reﬂect the
longer contribution period and the shorter length of the remaining retirement period, all
distortions with regard to labor market participation of older people can be eliminated. In
our simple framework, this calls for a conversion factor in (4) equal to m(x)=1 /(1 − x)
with α =1and m0 =0 . In this case, (1 − x)m0 = m. Since it implies Ψ =0 ,w eﬁnd
from (B.5) in the appendix that the direct eﬀect of the contribution rate, for any given
retirement date x, on the participation tax rate is zero, ∂τR/∂τ =0 . To understand why,
o n em u s tn o t et h a tt h ef a i rc o n v e r s i o nf a c t o r(1 − x)m =1eliminates any sensitivity of
18the implicit tax rate τL with respect to the retirement date so that intensive labor supply
of younger workers becomes independent of the retirement decision. Consequently, the
sensitivity of the assessment base z = L + x with respect to retirement reduces to the
retirement margin only, z0 =1(which obviously implies ∂z0/∂τ =0 ) .T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
assessment base z0 on account of a longer contribution period, and any direct impact ∂z/∂τ
of the ﬁrst period labor supply response on the assessment base, are fully translated into
an adjustment of the pension size so that the eﬀective retirement tax is unaﬀected. Using
in (B.3) the fact that a fair system is characterized by (1 − x)m0 = m, (1 − x)m = z0 =1
and ∂z0/∂τ =0 , and substituting into (B.1), indeed proves ∂τR/∂τ =0 .
However, this does not mean that such a system does not inﬂuence the retirement
date. The level of the participation tax rate is positive as long as there is a ﬂat, lump-
sum pension, τR = b. To see this, note the pension formula p = mτz + b,w i t hp0 =
τ [m0z + mz0].U s i n gz0 =1 , (1 − x)m0 = m as well as (1 − x)m =1in (12) conﬁrms the
result. If the higher contribution rate raises extra revenues beyond what is needed to pay
for the higher earnings-linked pensions, the ﬂat pension b becomes more generous, which,
in turn, raises the participation tax rate and leads to earlier retirement.
The extent of the tax revenue increase depends, of course, also on the resulting inten-
sive labor supply response. Even if the system is actuarially fair with respect to the retire-
ment date, the implicit tax rate on young workers is still positive, τL = τ ·(1 − 1/R) > 0,
since an unfunded system does not pay interest on accumulated contributions. An increase
in the statutory contribution rate thus raises the eﬀective tax component on contributions
and discourages intensive labor supply. To verify these statements, we solve the system
stated in (A.2) and (A.4). Since z0 =1and m0 = z00 =0in the present scenario, we have
τ0
R =0in (16), which eliminates the elasticity ε from the resulting expressions. Together
with ∂τR/∂τ =0 , the system reduces to
ˆ x = −
η
1 − τR
· db, db =
τRx
1 − x










where the terms in square brackets replaces the one in (A.4). To see this, note that the
PAYG budget constraint in (19) and the pension formula imply 1+x
1−x = p/τ = mz + b/τ.
19Using this expression and combining with (B.2)—(B.3) yields the term in square brackets
in (28).
The resulting solution can be illustrated using Figure 1. In contrast to the case of
a trend toward early retirement, the budget line shifts up in response to the rise in τ,
while the position of the retirement locus remains unchanged. Consequently, agents retire
earlier, and the system aﬀords a more generous ﬂat pension component. The comparative
static solution, using (28), corresponds to



























We have thus seen that expanding the system with an actuarially fair adjustment of the
conversion factor not only pays for a more generous earnings-linked pension, but also for a
higher ﬂat pension. The latter eﬀect raises the participation tax rate and results in early
retirement. In addition, the implicit tax rate on the young τL = τ · (1 − 1/R) increases,
because the adjustment of the conversion factor cannot undo the fact that contributions
in an unfunded system pay no interest and, thus, partly represent a tax on the young that
distorts intensive labor supply, ˆ L = −σ · ˆ τL < 0. According to (27), aggregate welfare
declines on both margins. The welfare loss would be zero on the extensive retirement
margin if, in the initial equilibrium, the ﬂat pension and, thus, the participation tax rate
were zero: τR = b =0 .
Fixed Labor Supply of Young Workers: When labor supply is completely insen-
sitive to variations in eﬀective wages (σ =0 ), the pension assessment base z = L + x
depends only on changes in the retirement date (z0 =1 ), so that ∂z/∂τ = ∂z0/∂τ =0 .I n
evaluating the impact of the statutory contribution rate on the participation tax rate, we
ﬁnd from (B.1)—(B.5)
∂τR/∂τ =1− α + m0 [z − (1 − x)] ≥ 0. (30)
20We assume in this scenario that the conversion factor m is ‘imperfectly’ fair–as it in
fact is in most countries–and allow for arbitrary parameter values α ∈ [0,1] and m0.15
If the conversion factor were fair, α =1and m0 =0 , a higher contribution rate would
not aﬀect the participation tax rate.
We now solve for the equilibrium impact of the policy change. With ﬁxed labor supply,
∂p/∂τ = mz. The PAYG budget constraint (19) implies (1 + x)/(1 − x)=p/τ while the
pension formula is rearranged to yield mz =( p − b)/τ. Substituting this expression into
the term square brackets in (A.4), the equilibrium system (A.2) and (A.4) simpliﬁes to












1−x · ˆ x + b
τ · dτ. Noting the deﬁnition of ∇ > 0 in
(21), the corresponding solution is












· dτ < 0,















The interpretation is of (31) straightforward. If the system is unfair with respect to
t h el e n g t ho fr e m a i n i n gr e t i r e m e n t ,a si nt h es t a n d a r dB i s m a r c k i a ns y s t e mw i t haﬁxed
tax-beneﬁt link m0,t h ea g e n tlooses when retiring an instant later. The net eﬀect of the
extra contribution plus pension foregone minus the present value of the increase in future
pensions reﬂects a positive participation tax. The loss on the extensive margin induces
agents to retire earlier, thereby worsening the system’s budgetary position. Consequently,
the retirement date declines and the ﬂat pension is reduced to keep the system sustainable
(if b is not too large initially). As a check on consistency, a fair system would involve
p = mτz with b =0and m =1 /(1 − x), implying ∂τR/∂τ =0 , as argued above. There
would then be no eﬀect on the retirement date.16 Given the impact on retirement, the
implication for economic eﬃciency in (27) is also clear. With a positive participation tax,
retirement already occurs ineﬃciently early, so that an expansion of the system can only
reinforce this distortion and lead to further eﬃciency losses.
15With z0 =1 , (12) and (15) imply τR = b+τ [1 − α + m0 (z − (1 − x))]. The second term shows how
the earnings-linked pension leads to a positive participation tax rate. If it were positive and, thus, unfair
initially, then the participation tax will increase with a higher contribution rate.
16The system would still redistribute intergenerationally, an issue that we do not analyze here.
21Flat Pensions: If pensions are lump-sum from an individual’s perspective and com-
pletely unrelated to past earnings, then labor market distortions are at their highest.
The absence of a tax-beneﬁtl i n ki sg i v e nb yα = m0 = m =0 , reducing the pension
formula to p = b.T h ee ﬀective tax rates on the intensive labor supply of younger workers
and on the participation of their older counterparts are τL = τ and τR = τ + p, respec-
tively. Clearly, the participation tax rate is independent of the retirement date, implying
τ0
R = ε =0 . The absence of a tax-beneﬁt link also implies ∂p/∂τ =0and, of course,
∂τR/∂τ =1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h es y s t e mi n( A . 2 )a n d( A . 4 )r e d u c e st oˆ x = −
η
1−τR [db + dτ]
and db =
τRx
1−x · ˆ x + 1+x
1−x · dτ, yielding a solution


























An increased contribution rate in a system without tax-beneﬁt link leads to earlier
retirement and more generous ﬂat pensions. The pension level grows less than propor-
tionally, because earlier retirement erodes the tax base, depending on the magnitude of
the participation distortion τR and the extensive elasticity η. The increase in the eﬀective
tax rate τL = τ also reduces ﬁrst period labor supply and the welfare of young workers.
3.3 Excess Burden
This subsection provides a sharp characterization of the eﬃciency loss from expanding
a PAYG pension system without a tax-beneﬁt link. The absence of a tax-beneﬁtl i n k
and the assumption of intertemporally separable preferences imply that pension budgets
and labor market behavior can be analyzed independently in each period without any
spillover. Although special, this case allows for a particularly simple and illuminating
characterization of the excess burden from lump-sum PAYG pensions. Intensive labor
supply L occurs in the ﬁrst period and depends only on the ﬁrst period tax rate τ1, while
retirement behavior refers to the second period and depends exclusively on the second
22period tax rate τ2. In this case, τL = τ1 leads to an intensive labor supply response in













Clearly, a permanent increase in contribution ﬁnanced ﬂat pensions (dτ1 = dτ2) reduces
aggregate welfare on both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply.
We now develop a metric to evaluate the marginal excess burden of a tax, which is
deﬁned as the marginal loss in welfare in percent of net tax revenue raised at the margin.
Using the budget relationships in (19) for a ﬂat pension system, we write the intertemporal
budget constraint as
T ≡ τ1L +







In measuring the excess burden of a PAYG system, we must take care of the overall
impact of the behavioral response on the public budget. Not only the tax τ2 but also the
spending p distorts labor market participation of older workers. A policy-induced trend
to early retirement erodes the contribution tax base and also generates extra pension
claims. For this reason, the change in contribution revenues would capture only a part,
perhaps relatively unimportant, of the overall ﬁscal cost of early retirement. We thus
need to consider the participation tax revenue in the second period, equal to (τ2 + p)x =
τRx. It measures the total gain in the public budget when labor market participation is
increased from zero to x and consists of contribution payments plus expenditure savings
on pensions. The meaning of this deﬁnition is also seen from the budget constraint in (1),
C2 = RS+x+p−τRx. If there where no participation at all, pension spending would have
been p. When retirement is postponed by x, the individual pays extra contributions and
foregoes pensions over this time interval, which adds up to a total loss τRx. The public
budget improves by the same amount. This “participation tax revenue” (τ2 + p)x = p−τ2
is equal to maximum pension spending p, reduced by the contribution τ2 from the future
generation.
With lump-sum pensions, τR = τ2 +p and τL = τ1. Using the retirement response to
an increase in contribution-ﬁnanced ﬂat pensions in (32), as well as ˆ x = −ηˆ τR, yields the





















According to (35), the present value of the budget impact depends on the size of the
induced labor supply response on both the intensive and extensive margins.
The marginal excess burden is deﬁn e da st h em a r g i n a l ,i n c o m ee q u i v a l e n tw e l f a r el o s s
per additional unit of net tax revenue raised, expressed in present value over all periods.

































importance of the intensive and extensive margins, such that ωL+ωx =1 .M o r e o v e r ,t h e









These are familiar formulas in the tax literature. In raising the contribution rate to
pay for a pension rise, this policy causes people to choose early retirement. Each unit of
earlier retirement causes a double burden on the ﬁscal budget equal to the participation
tax rate. The general structure of the MCPF formula in (37) is parallel to that found
in Kleven and Kreiner (2006), who also considered the welfare consequences of tax and
beneﬁt changes in a static model, and Immervoll et al. (2007). Their analyses is applied
here with appropriate modiﬁcations to characterize the excess burden of public pensions.
The excess burden with respect to the retirement decision is driven by the measures of
the participation tax rate, or implicit retirement tax, as suggested by Gruber and Wise
(1999b, 2005). The relevant retirement elasticity for Germany is estimated by Börsch
Supan (2000).
244 Parametric Pension Reform
4.1 Stronger Tax-BeneﬁtL i n k
Many countries recently reformed their PAYG pension systems. To undo some of their
damaging labor market eﬀects and, in particular, to raise the average retirement age,
policy makers have aimed primarily at strengthening the tax-beneﬁt link and introducing
a greater degree of actuarial fairness. For example, in order to strengthen old age labor
market participation, Austria has introduced substantial supplements to regular pensions
when work is continued beyond the statutory retirement age and pension discounts, or
‘penalties’, for early retirement. Further, the length of the calculation period has been
signiﬁcantly prolonged: in other words, the number of years of past earnings that count
towards future pensions has been increased. In addition, the pension system was harmo-
nized so that some occupational groups, such as civil servants who previously received
pensions largely unrelated to past earnings, have been integrated into the same earnings-
linked system. These measures represent diﬀerent ways of strengthening the tax-beneﬁt
link by making it more widespread, thereby reducing the importance of ﬂat lump-sum
pensions.17
W i t h i no u rs i m p l ef r a m e w o r k ,w ec a na n a l y z et h i sp o l i c yi n i t i a t i v eb yc o n s i d e r i n g
an increase in the ﬁxed component m0 of the conversion factor m = α/(1 − x)+m0.
To avoid complex calculations that yield no additional insight, we set m0 =0in the
initial equilibrium and allow α ∈ [0,1]. Since this clearly raises earnings-linked pension
levels, we endogenously cut the lump-sum pension component b to satisfy the PAYG
budget constraint when the statutory contribution rate is kept constant. In Appendix
B we compute, see (B.6)—(B.10), the partial eﬀects on the size of the earnings-linked
pension and the participation tax rate. Among other results, we ﬁnd that an increased
17See Knell et al. (2006) for an informative description of pension reform in Austria. Fehr et al. (2003)
study, by means of numerical simulations of the Norwegian economy, the implications of reforms that
reduce the importance of the non-actuarial component of pensions.
25conversion factor directly raises the pension level. It also lowers the eﬀective tax rate
of young workers, because they individually expect larger future pensions when working
more. This stimulates labor supply, augments the assessment base, and further raises
pension size. However, a larger pension raises the participation tax rate. On the other
hand, this incentive for early retirement is mitigated by the fact that the policy measure
also raises the pension supplement p that becomes available upon choosing a marginally
higher retirement age. It must be kept in mind, nevertheless, that the ﬂat pension is
endogenously cut to sustain the PAYG budget, which, in turn, causes people retire later.
To verify our logic, we solve the system (A.2) and (A.4) and note that τ0
R = ε =0 ,
starting from a position of m0 =0

























where ∇ i sg i v e ni n( 2 1 ) . T h es i g no ft h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i ce ﬀects is determining by














Hence, a tighter tax-beneﬁt link raises the retirement age, ˆ x>0, and reduces the lump-
sum pension level, db < 0. In addition, the partial derivatives in (B.7)—(B.10) imply
∂τR/∂m0 > 0 and ∂p/∂m0 > 0. Moreover, the lump-sum pension component falls to such
an extent that in equilibrium, despite of the direct eﬀect ∂τR/∂m0 > 0, the participation
tax rate declines, which increases x. The response to the pension reform is illustrated in
Figure 2.
As indicated, although the partial eﬀect on the participation tax rate in (B.10) is posi-
tive, it falls in equilibrium due to the large reduction in lump-sum pensions, which results
in a later retirement date. Noting the pension formula (14) and taking the diﬀerential of
















26Substituting the equilibrium changes of retirement age and lump-sum pensions as noted
in (38) and using the partial eﬀects stated in (39) and Appendix B, we ﬁnd, after some
lengthy computations, ˆ x = −η·ˆ τR > 0,w i t hˆ x>0 as in (38). This reﬂe c t st h a tf a c tt h a t






Fig. 2: Tighter Tax BeneﬁtL i n k
The intensive labor supply response of young workers, ˆ L = −σ · ˆ τL,d e p e n d so nt h e
equilibrium change of the implicit tax rate τL = τ [1 − (1 − x)m/R]. Since the statutory
contribution rate remains constant, the log-diﬀerential yields




which implies that the tax-beneﬁt link reduces the implicit tax rate on young workers,
thereby stimulating intensive labor supply. Under the conditions stated above, a stronger
tax-beneﬁt link reduces the eﬀective tax rates on both margins of aggregate labor supply,
leading, according to (27), to (potentially) substantial welfare gains.
4.2 Greater Actuarial Fairness
We next explore the beneﬁts of introducing a greater degree of actuarial fairness. Specif-
ically, we ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of strengthening the tax-beneﬁtl i n kb yr a i s i n gt h e
27conversion factor so that pension earnings are more sensitive to the retirement date. The
scenario, thus, involves an increase in the parameter α, where the conversion factor is
m = α/(1 − x),w i t hm0 =0 . The lump-sum pension must be cut to keep the system
sustainable when past earnings translate into more generous pensions. We calculate in the
appendix, using (B.11)—(B.14), the partial eﬀects for any given retirement date x and ﬁnd
that the participation tax rate is reduced by18 ∂τR/∂α = −τ, while the earnings-linked
pension component becomes larger, ∂p/∂α > 0. Solving (A.2) and (A.4) yields19





















which imply an increase in the retirement date, ˆ x>0. Except for extreme cases, the
lump-sum pension must be cut, db < 0, when the earnings-linked component becomes
larger.20 Moreover, the policy change is strictly welfare improving. Since ε =0 ,t h e









1−τR.A s b e f o r e ,
substituting the solutions from (42) yields, after some manipulations, the result satisfying
ˆ x = −η · ˆ τR.T h e r i s e i n α also leads to a decline in the implicit tax rate on younger
workers. The results with respect to the eﬀective tax rates is summarized as follows:











Since both eﬀective tax rates fall, aggregate labor supply on the intensive and extensive
margins is stimulated. Depending on the magnitude of the initial labor market distortions,
aggregate eﬃciency improves.
The scenario discussed above not only introduces more actuarial fairness, but also
makes earnings-linked pensions more generous, since it raises the conversion factor. To a
18In the speciﬁc case considered here, we can obtain a closed form solution: since z0 =1 ,w eh a v e
p0 = τ [m + m0z].U s i n gτR = τ + p − (1 − x)p0 and (1 − x)m0 = m,w et h e nd e r i v eτR = b +( 1− α)τ.
19If the coeﬃcient m0 =0so that (1 − x)m0 = m, the following restrictions can be used: z0 =1
and Ψ =0=z00, hence τ0



















and τ − τL = ατ/R.
20A limited countervailing eﬀect arises, since the pension is paid over a shorter period, which allows
the possibility of a larger pension, when retirement is postponed.
28large extent, however, recent pension reform policy is dictated by the need to restore ﬁscal
sustainability, a goal hardly compatible with replacing a greater part of past earnings. To
consider situations closer to actual policy challenges, we evaluate the following reform
scenario: raise the parameter α to introduce more actuarial fairness and at the same time








The scenario implies that the conversion factor m = α/(1 − x)+m0 remains constant for
any given retirement behavior. The conversion factor increases only if the policy measure
leads workers to postpone retirement. To keep calculations simple, we start from an initial
situation of m0 =0so that m0 = m/(1 − x).21
To derive the comparative static eﬀects and the welfare consequences of this policy
experiment, we need to determine the partial eﬀects on pensions p, the participation tax
rate τR and the pension supplement p0. To do so, we impose the policy change dm0 = − dα
1−x
and evaluate derivatives at the initial position m0 =0and m = α/(1 − x). Using (B.7)—
(B.8) and (B.12)—(B.13), as well as (1 − x)mτ/R = τ − τL from the deﬁnition of the
eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t e ,w es h o wt h a tt h ep a r t i a le ﬀects on pension earnings completely cancel.
T h er e s u l ti sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h ep o l i c yi n i t i a t i v e ,f o rag i v e nr e t i r e m e n td a t e ,h o l d s













































The partial eﬀect on the participation tax rate follows upon substituting (B.10) and (B.14)
and is negative: greater actuarial fairness is designed to reduce the participation tax rate
and to encourage workers to postpone retirement. To achieve this, the government must
increase the pension supplement p0 that becomes available for each instant of postponed
retirement.
21Strictly speaking, m0 < 0 after the policy change, to oﬀset the increase in m due to a higher α.
29The equilibrium impact of the policy reform is found, as before, by solving the system
(A.2) and (A.4). Using the results given above and noting τ0
R = ε =0if evaluated at
m0 =0 ,w ec a l c u l a t e





















1−xη. As indicated, the policy experiment in (44) keeps pension
size ﬁxed if retirement date does not change, but oﬀers larger pension supplements when
retirement is postponed. Consequently, it succeeds in reducing the participation tax
rate and encouraging later retirement. The scenario unambiguously raises the lump-sum
pension b since it expands the assessment base and shortens the retirement period.
In equilibrium, with ε =0 ,t h ee ﬀect of retirement choice x on τR disappears. Substi-
tution of (45) shows that the participation tax rate falls by






which conﬁrms ˆ x = −η · ˆ τR and is consistent with (46). A welfare evaluation employing
(27) requires the calculation of the eﬀect on the eﬀective tax rate on young workers
and their intensive labor supply response. Imposing the policy change noted above and





· [mdx − (1 − x)dm]=0 . (48)
A c c o r d i n gt o( 4 8 ) ,t h ee ﬀe c t i v et a xr a t eo ny o u n gw o r k e r si si n d e p e n d e n to ft h ep o l i c y
scenario in (44), implying that period labor supply remains constant. The experiment
fails to reduce distortions faced by young workers and, thus, cannot promise any further
eﬃciency gains on that margin. The main advantage of the policy package is the reduction
of the participation tax rate. By encouraging later retirement, it potentially results in
welfare gains on the extensive margin.
305C o n c l u s i o n
The potential labor market impact of pension reform is a prime policy concern. Aging
and the socioeconomic trend to early retirement not only impose ﬁnancial stress on the
system, but are also an important factor in restraining aggregate employment. The need
to provide incentives for the continuing labor market participation of older workers has,
thus, received increasing attention among policy makers. For example, the tax character
and the potentially harmful impact on labor supply incentives of prime-age workers is
a particular concern. In this context, recent reform initiatives in many countries aim
at reducing the large participation tax rates incorporated in current pension systems.
For instance, pension formulas have been modiﬁed to oﬀer income supplements for each
year of postponed retirement and pension ‘penalties’ have been imposed when earlier
retirement is chosen. Other measures seek to improve work incentives of younger, prime-
age workers by strengthening the tax-beneﬁt link. In Austria concrete examples of pension
reforms include the “harmonization” of the pension system, with the consequence that
civil servants and other employee groups who have previously received lump-sum pensions
unrelated to past earnings, are now included in the same earnings-linked pension system.
Moreover, Austria, along with other countries, has lengthened the calculation period for
the pension assessment base so that not only the best ﬁve years, but also the entire
earnings history matter in determining the size of the pension. These purpose of these
r e f o r m si st or a i s et h es h a r eo fp r i m e - a g ew o r k e r sw h oa r es u b j e c tt oat a x - b e n e ﬁtl i n ka n d
will, as a result, perceive that their pension contributions have a lower tax component.
As such, these reforms are suitable to stimulate labor supply and employment among
younger workers.
This paper has proposed a simple model that captures the important interaction be-
tween labor supply incentives of prime-age workers and incentives for labor market par-
ticipation of workers near retirement. We show that the joint policy goals of stimulating
young and old age labor supply can conﬂict with each other. In a system with a tax-beneﬁt
link, raising the retirement age tends to raise the eﬀective tax faced by young, prime-age
31workers. When the retirement date is postponed, the extra pension beneﬁts expected
by a young worker from increased earnings are obtained only in the more distant future
and over a shorter retirement period. Consequently, these future earnings are discounted
more heavily, which raises the tax component for any given pension contribution. For the
same reasons, we ﬁnd that an exogenous, socioeconomic trend to early retirement raises
prime-age labor supply, which tends to oﬀset the reduction in aggregate employment due
to lower old age labor market participation. In view of this trade-oﬀ, policy makers should
be careful to design reforms in a way that strengthens both margins of labor supply in an
aging society.
Fortunately, our analysis shows that some recent reform approaches can attain this
objective. If it is possible to cut lump-sum pensions, for example, by “harmonizing” the
system, an increase in the tax-beneﬁt link indeed tends to stimulate both margins of la-
bor supply, regardless of whether the link is also made actuarially fair with respect to the
retirement date. However, if the conversion factor determining pension size conditional
on past earnings is made more sensitive with respect to retirement age without raising
its overall magnitude, then such a reform, while encouraging old age labor market par-
ticipation, does not stimulate employment among prime-age workers. Nevertheless, this
scenario shows that any given increase in the tax-beneﬁt link is much preferred if it is
also made actuarially fair in the sense of Gruber and Wise, compared to one that is not
sensitive to a worker’s retirement choice.
Appendix
A Comparative Statics
This appendix computes comparative static results. We log-linearize the model and com-
pute proportional rates of change relative to a given initial equilibrium. Intensive labor
supply in (11) depends exclusively on pension parameters and the retirement date. Tak-
ing account of this, equilibrium is given by a retirement date x and a ﬂat pension b that
32satisfy the optimality condition for retirement (12) subject to (14) and budget balance of
the PAYG system (19).
Pension earnings given by (14) are a complex function of the parameters of the system:
p(x,b;τ,m0,α)=m(x;m0,α)τz(x;τ,m0,α)+b. Obviously, p0 ≡ ∂p/∂x is independent
of the ﬂat pension b.W ed e r i v eh o wt h er e l a t i v ec h a n g eˆ τR ≡ dτR/(1 − τR) of the par-
ticipation tax rate depends on changes in retirement behavior, x, and pension parameters
τ, m0, α and b.T h ee ﬀective tax rate τR ≡ τ + p − (1 − x)p0 is deﬁned in (12). Deﬁn-
ing the elasticity ε ≡ τ0
Rx/(1 − τR),w h e r eτ0
R i sg i v e ni n( 1 6 ) ,a n dn o t i n gt h a tp e n s i o n
parameters aﬀect the participation tax rate by their impact on p and p0,w eo b t a i n



















The derivatives of τR will be speciﬁed later when we discuss speciﬁc policy scenarios.
Substituting (A.1) into the retirement response noted in (13), we derive, after rearranging,
the following equation for the impact on retirement in terms of parametric shifts and the
change db in the endogenous level of ﬂat pensions:















dα +( 1− τR) ˆ β
¸
. (A.2)
This equation corresponds to the retirement locus in Figures 1 and 2. It is downward
sloping, since a more generous ﬂat pension induces, holding (τ,m0,α) constant, earlier
retirement.
The other constraint to pin down equilibrium is the condition for budget balance in
(19): τ ·(1 + x)=( 1− x)p. Taking the diﬀerential of revenues and pension spending, we
obtain



































33This equation corresponds to the PAYG budget locus in Figures 1 and 2. It is upward
sloping since an increase in retirement age relaxes the pension budget and allows for a
larger ﬂat pension as long as the participation tax rate τR is positive. This is intuitive
since the participation tax measures the net ﬁscal loss to households, and, thus, the net
gain to the system, when retirement is marginally postponed. The tax rate τR captures
the extra tax paid plus the pension earnings foregone minus the increase in pensions
over the remaining life-time 1 − x, which corresponds to the number of pensioners in the
cross-section of the population.
The solution of (A.2) and (A.4) determines the reduced-form, equilibrium expressions
for the retirement response and the size of the ﬂat, lump-sum pension payments in terms
of the changes in the system parameters (τ,m0,α) and the preference parameter β.T h i s
solution yields, in turn, the reactions of the other variables of interest: the response of
intensive labor supply of young workers through the impact of retirement age on the
implicit tax, as discussed above in (10) and (11). We can also infer the impact on the
participation tax of the old, which yields the welfare change according to (23).
BE ﬀects on the Participation Tax Rate
Statutory Tax Rate: In Appendix B we calculate how pension reform aﬀects the
participation tax rate: τR = τ + p − (1 − x)p0. T od os o ,w em u s tc o m p u t ei t sp a r -











The impact on earnings-linked pensions depends on the reaction of the assessment base,
z = x + L, which, in turn, is driven by ﬁrst period labor supply in (9). Using τL as
given in (6) and holding x constant, we ﬁnd that a higher contribution rate discourages












· σL < 0. (B.2)
34In calculating the eﬀect on pensions p = mτz + b, we note that the conversion factor
m = α
1−x +m0 and its derivative m0 = α
(1−x)2 = m−m0
1−x are independent of τ. A higher con-
tribution rate thus aﬀects the pension level and the pension increment p0 = τ ·[zm0 + mz0]



























The term z0 =1+L0 =1−Ψ,w i t hΨ ≡ σL
1−τL · m0τ
R , follows from (11).22 Assuming a ﬁxed











Using the relationships (1 − x)m0 = m − m0 = α/(1 − x) and substituting the relevant
derivatives into (B.1) yields
∂τR
∂τ =1 − α + m0 ·
h












From this general expression, we deduce several cases: full actuarial fairness: α =1 ,
m0 = Ψ =0 , and hence ∂τR/∂τ =0 . The zero participation tax rate is independent
of the remaining a positive eﬀective tax on young workers, τL = τ · [1 − 1/R],w h i c hi s
smaller than the statutory rate because PAYG contributions earn no interest. The other
extreme case is no tax-beneﬁtl i n k ,α = m0 =0 ,s ot h a t∂τR/∂τ =1 .
The case with a ﬁxed conversion factor independent of retirement behavior, m = m0
and α =0 , yields an intermediate case. The square bracket can safely be assumed
positive, at least if the labor supply elasticity is not too large. In our simple model,
the worker-retiree ratio is (1 + x)/(1 − x), which exceeds unity in a realistic setting. If,
instead, taking the eﬀective number of workers, L + x, and realistically assuming that
hours worked of young and older workers are not too diﬀerent, i.e. L close to 1,w ea l s o
have z = L+x>(1 − x). Therefore, the ﬁrst two terms in the square bracket are clearly
positive. A natural assumption, which is actually stronger than required, is that the
22Indeed, we have m0 and not m in Ψ.M o r e o v e r ,b o t hm0 and m are independent of τ.
35erosion of the assessment base will not be so large as to exceed the net eﬀect of the ﬁrst
t w ot e r m si nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e t .
It will also be instructive to consider the case of ﬁxed ﬁrst period labor supply, given by
σ = Ψ =0 , which again leads to an increase in the participation tax rate if the statutory
tax rate is raised,
∂τR
∂τ =1− α + m0 [z − (1 − x)] > 0, α ∈ [0,1]. By continuity, the total
eﬀect on
∂τR
∂τ remains positive at least for small values of σ. In any case, the inﬂuence of
L is likely to be small, given the econometric evidence on the labor supply response of
young workers.
Tax-BeneﬁtL i n k : Consider the eﬀect of a tighter tax-beneﬁt link m = α/(1 − x)+m0,
through a rise in m0, starting from m0 =0 . The parameter α ∈ [0,1] can take arbitrary










Using τL as given in (6), and holding x constant, we ﬁnd that a tax-beneﬁt link encourages












· σL > 0. (B.7)
Raising the conversion factor m0 aﬀects the pension level, p = τmz+ b, and the pension























S i n c ew ee v a l u a t et h ep o l i c yc h a n g es t a r t i n gf r o mm0 =0in the initial equilibrium,
the marginal eﬀect of later retirement on the assessment base is unity, z0 =1+L0 =
1.G i v e n m0 =0initially, the term (1 − x)m = α and the eﬀective tax rate τL =
τ [1 − (1 − x)m/R] remain constant, and therefore, ﬁrst period labor supply, is indepen-










36Combining (B.6)—(B.9) and noting that m0 =0implies (1 − x)m0 = m, yields
∂τR
∂m0
= τ [z − (1 − x)] > 0. (B.10)
When strengthening the tax-beneﬁt link by raising m0 from an initial value of m0 =0 ,
the partial eﬀect on the participation tax rate reduces to ∂τR/∂m0 = τ [z − (1 − x)] > 0,
where the square bracket can safely be assumed positive as before.
More Actuarial Fairness: Raising the parameter α not only introduces a tighter tax-
beneﬁt link, but also makes it fairer. Again, we assume m0 =0initially. The partial

























The conversion factor changes by ∂m/∂α =1 /(1 − x) and ∂m0/∂α =1 /(1 − x)
2.T h e
tax-beneﬁtl i n kt h u sa ﬀects the pension level p = mτz + b a n dt h ep e n s i o ni n c r e m e n t


























Our assumption of m0 =0initially implies that (1 − x)m = α does not vary with x.
Later retirement thus expands the assessment base z = L+x by z0 =1 ,w i t h∂z0/∂α =0 .










Consequently, introducing more actuarially fairness reduces the participation tax rate.
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